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Enterprise in transition:
institutional framework, economic behavior and the implications for 
macroeconomic management.
Retrospective look on Russia in the 90th.
The transformation of Eastern and 
Central Europe presents an 
unprecedented challenge for policy 
makers in these countries as well as for 
the international community involved in 
financing and monitoring their economic 
programs. It is also an unusual 
challenge for the economics profession, 
mainly because there is hardly any past 
experience from which lessons could be 
learned for this transition process.
Michael Bruno
Abstract.
The Russian experience showed that macroeconomic performance in the transition 
economy is crucially dependent of the right microeconomic fundamentals. The paper 
offers retrospective view on the initial stages of market transformation in Russia from 
the point of view of interrelationships between enterprise behavior and 
macroeconomic performance.
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11. Introduction.
The economic system of the Russian Federation has undergone major institutional 
and structural changes in the 90th in the course of its transition from the central 
planning to the market economy. The major reform measures included:
 price liberalization in January 1992;
 tax reform in December 1991;
 liberalization of foreign trade regime in November-December 1991;
 unification of the exchange rate from July 1, 1992;
 mass privatization in 1992-1994.
The macroeconomic performance in Russia is summarized in Table 1:
Table 1.
Macroeconomic performance in Russia, 1992-2000
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000*
Real GDP 
growth, %
-14.5 -8.7 -12.7 -4.1 -3.5 0.8 -4.6 3.2 6.5
Change in CPI 
index, %
1,526 875 311 198 47.8 14.7 86.1 27.6 20.7
General 
government 
balance, % of 
GDP
-18.9 -7.3 -10.4 -6.0 -8.9 -7.6 -8.0 -1.0 2.0
Unemployment  
rate, %
5.3 6.0 7.8 9.0 9.9 11.2 13.3 11.7 na
Current account 
balance, % of 
GDP
na na 2.1 1.4 1.7 0.1 0.8 13.6 17.2
Foreign direct 
investment, 
million USD
na na 500 1,663 1,665 4,036 1,734 746 2,000
External debt, 
billion USD**
na na 120.9 127.0 135.1 134.1 157.7 158.5 na
Exchange rate, 
ruble per USD, 
end period***
0.5 1.2 3.6 4.6 5.6 6.0 20.7 26.8 na
Source: EBRD Transition Report 2000.
*EBRD projections
**Includes public debt only
*** In denominated rubles
The Russian economy has recovered after the financial crisis in August 1998. The 
recovery was driven by:
 high oil prices at the world market and the high value of Russian exports ;
 growth of domestic production beyond the energy sector in the aftermath of ruble 
devaluation due to imports substitution.
2But the new environment of the world economy at the end of 2000th shows the 
fragility of such type of economic growth. First, the oil and other resource prices at 
the world market are beyond the control of Russian producers and it makes the 
Russian economy dependent on the developments at the world oil market. Second, the 
weak ruble damages the national imports – and not only consumer imports, but also 
producer imports of equipment and technology – which impedes structural changes in 
the real sector.
At the same time the past decade showed the complexity of the enterprise reform 
and restructuring in the post-communist transition. The Russian enterprise sector 
(especially in manufacturing industries) faced serious problems in adjustment to the 
market system. One could observe that the economic behavior of enterprises in the 
period of transition differed in many important respects from that of the companies 
within the mature market system. In our opinion, the origin of these behavioral 
differences should be traced to the institutional and structural features of the 
enterprises in transition and their evolution over time (and especially at the initial 
stages of transition). 
Policy makers should understand the logic of enterprise behavior in the transition 
economies because:
 enterprise reform and restructuring themselves are among the most important and 
difficult parts of the transition process to the market economy and hence should be 
in the focus of economic policies in the transformation period;
 design of any reasonable macroeconomic policy (including macroeconomic 
stabilization programs) should explicitly specify the microeconomic conditions 
under which such policy may be implemented.
The paper has the following main objectives:
 to make the brief outline of the nature of enterprise and the character of the 
industrial organization within the socialist system as the starting point of 
transformation and to describe the final goals of transition at the enterprise and 
industrial level;
 to characterize how the institutional framework (sets of formal and informal rules) 
within which the enterprise in the transition economies functions is evolving 
through the transition period (both internal and external) and how it in practice 
affects the incentives for and the behavior of main agents within the enterprise 
(managers, shareholders, employees, investors);
 to characterize the specific features of its economic behavior of the enterprise in 
the transition economies (with special emphasis on investment and financing 
decisions and the behavior in payments due to suppliers, financial institutions and 
governments);
 to derive the implications for macroeconomic management which follow from the 
specific features of the economic behavior of the enterprise in transition 
economies.1
The paper proceeds as follows. In Section II we deliver the analysis of key 
features of the enterprise in the socialist economy. In Section III we deal with the 
1 The new classical macroeconomics requires specifying clearly the microfoundations of the 
macroeconomic analysis since individual economic agents in the market economy take all the 
decisions.
3enterprise responses to market reforms. Finally, Section IV concludes on policy 
alternatives which President Vladimir Putin faced at the start of his tenure after the 
roaring 90th.
II. Enterprise in the socialist system: starting point of transition.
The classical socialist system emerged in the Soviet Union in the 30th as a result of 
Stalin-led industrialization that was accompanied by collectivist reforms in agriculture 
and cultural revolution.2 The main institutional features of such system could be 
characterized as follows:
 dominance of state ownership of the productive assets;
 central planning of the volume and structure of production in natural units;
 central resource management;
 central management of the national consumption, saving and investment;
 state monopoly of the foreign trade and foreign exchange transactions;
 subordinate role of money, credit and finance in the economic life;
 government regulation of all kinds of prices throughout the economy (prices of 
goods, wages and interest rates);
 administrative coordination of all economic activities in order to sustain 
macroeconomic equilibrium.
The macroeconomic decision making within the Soviet system was highly 
politicized and influenced by political priorities of the top leadership. The top 
priorities included high rates of growth of heavy and defense industries in order to 
sustain high level of military power.
Relatively high level of saving and investment, full employment, relatively stable 
official prices, extensive type of economic growth characterized the macroeconomic 
performance. The important feature of the socialist system was the permanent 
presence of shortages of goods and services throughout the economy.3
Under such system there were no direct interaction between the producers and 
consumers, all economic links were arranged through central planning and central 
resource management agencies. The role of enterprise within such system could be 
characterized as follows: 
 enterprises were not the independent units of economic activity and economic 
decision making within the socialist economy;
 prevailing economic function of the enterprise was to arrange the current 
production process;
 all decisions on resource supply (and suppliers), shipment of products (and 
customers), investment, innovation, changes in the structure of production, prices 
and wages, financing were taken by the central governance bodies;
 principal agents within the enterprise were top managers-which were appointed by 
the government bodies and managed on behalf of the state-and the employees;
 managers of the enterprises were engaged in complicated bargaining with the 
government agencies over plan targets and resource supply.
2 For a comprehensive positive analysis of the socialist system see: Kornai J. “The Socialist System: 
Political Economy of Communism”, 1992.
3 See Kornai J. “The Economics of Shortage”, 1980.
4The industrial organization was characterized by dominance of large plants and 
industrial complexes with the rigid links among them. There was clear tendency to 
develop a wide range of economic activities within such complexes since managers 
often could not rely on their counterparts for efficient supply of goods and services. 
The system evolved over time but preserved its key features. The successive 
economic reforms in the Soviet Union tried to increase the scope of authority of 
enterprise managers in economic decision making and their responsibility for 
economic performance. 
The most comprehensive reform package was introduced in 1988. It included:
 Law on State Enterprise which created the formal legal framework for the 
functioning of state enterprises, state-enterprise relations and the interaction 
between main actors (management and employees) inside the state enterprises;
 abolition of natural planning and its replacement with indicative targets in 
monetary terms;
 more power to managers in investment, wage and pricing decisions;4
 Law on Cooperatives created legal framework for development of private 
entrepreneurial activities.
But the practical implementation of those measures led to disastrous results. 
Managers and employees used new possibilities to raise their incomes not via higher 
productivity but through increasing prices and redistributing funds from investment to 
consumption. They pursue short-term goals at the expense of long-term development. 
The state enterprises got much more power in decision making but the strict financial 
discipline has not been imposed.
The behavior of economic agents – who got more power but were not subject to 
strict financial discipline – led to severe macroeconomic imbalances. The situation 
worsened due to permanently high level of military expenditures even in the period of 
reform package implementation. The Soviet economy faced growing budget deficit, 
sharpening of shortages, rising open inflation, and increasing foreign debt.
III. Market transformation and enterprise responses.
Disintegration of the Soviet Union after the failure of the Communist 
conservatives’ attempt to revise the reformist policies of General Secretary Gorbachev 
and the transfer of real power in the Russian Federation to the newly elected President 
Boris Yeltsin opened the door to market reforms in the country. The team of 
economists led by Mr. Yegor Gaidar chose the radical approach to economic 
liberalization and orthodox approach to subsequent macroeconomic stabilization.5
4 The political decisions were influences (though not followed strictly) by the theory of optimal 
planning which had been developed in the Soviet Union since 1960th as an alternative to the orthodox 
view of the socialist economic system. The fundamental ideas could be summarized as follows:
 the central management of the economy can be executed via optimal prices which are set by the 
central governance body;
 enterprises take production and investment decisions themselves on the basis of such prices.
The first comprehensive discussion of the ideas of the “market socialism” in the Western literature can 
be found in: Xayek F(ed.) “The Collectivist Economic Planning”, 1935. 
5 The analysis of the macroeconomic policies and relevant political debate in Russia is beyond the 
scope of this paper. But it’s worthwhile to mention that “shock therapy” as the reformist team had 
designed it in 1992 failed in part of macroeconomic stabilization even at the stage of implementation. 
5The process of transition from the centrally planned economy to the market 
system included substantial changes within the enterprise sector. One could hardly say 
that the government pursued any comprehensive strategy towards enterprise sector or 
set any clear final goals for its transformation. But in the course of transition the 
following substantial changes took place:
 complete elimination of all forms of central planning and central resource 
management;
 economic decision making has been transferred to the enterprise level (including 
resource supply, sales to customers, investment and financing, innovation, foreign 
economic activities);
 the government started the process of privatization of state-owned enterprises in 
different forms (mass voucher privatization, loans for shares scheme, monetary 
auctions, investment tenders, etc.);
 the door was opened to establishment of new private firms and the emergence of 
potential competition within the country;
 the legal framework for entrepreneurial activities gradually emerged;6
 the new accounting standards and practices which satisfy the requirements of the 
market economy are gradually being implemented.7
These developments clearly gradually changed the rules and incentives for 
enterprises and the main actors within the enterprises. At the same time the process of 
transformation at the enterprise and consequently the industrial levels is by its nature 
the evolutionary process which requires considerable period of time for its 
completion. The economic history of the past decade provides evidence on the 
enterprise responses to market transformation and shows the problems in market 
adjustment.
2.1 Enterprise sector developments: facts and figures.
The overall dynamics of the development of the enterprise sector in the Russian 
Federation is summarized in the following Table 2.
The data shows that in the course of transition the total number of separate units in 
Russia gradually increased. In 1994-2000 (as of January 1st of each year) the total 
number grew 2.5 times. The positive permanent upward tendency characterized the 
majority of economic sectors. 
The notable exception was agriculture where the increase in the number of 
economic units reversed to gradual decline. The primary factor behind this was the 
Many observers in Russia even before the choice of the reform strategy had predicted such an outcome. 
The main argument behind this reasoning concerned with the unique structural and institutional 
features that Russia inherited from the Soviet Union mostly due to the military oriented economic 
growth (See, for example, Y. Yaremenko “The Economics of Hypocrisy”, Pravda, 1.09.1990). Russia 
actually had shock without the therapy.
6 The most important achievement was the Civil Code of the Russian Federation that creates the legal 
framework for economic activities of the private agents and forms the basis for corporate law, contract 
law, securities market legislation, bankruptcy law, etc. Two parts of the Code has been implemented by 
now and the third part, which deals with the intellectual property rights and foreign economic activities, 
is yet to be worked out and approved by the Parliament.
7 The new Russian Accounting Standards will be based on the International Accounting Standards. By 
now Ministry of Finance has issued major regulations on new accounting practices. Now the new Chart 
of Accounts is to be implemented in order to finalize the transition to the accounting standards and 
practices that are compatible with recognized international standards and practices.
6decline in the number of the private farms that could be explained by low pace of 
institutional reforms in agriculture and the severe political struggle over the issue of 
private property for land. These political and institutional uncertainties create 
relatively unfavorable business environment for private farming.
Table 2.
Enterprises and organizations in Russia, 1992-2000
1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 1994-2000,times
Total number,
thousands
1244.9 1946.3 2249.5 2504.5 2727.1 2901.2 3106.4 2.5
industry 212.3 288.7 310.3 323.8 339.4 352.4 371.6 1.8
construction 164.4 235.4 258.6 273.9 286.9 298.0 309.4 1.9
transport and 
communications
36.0 47.5 53.1 62.7 71.2 79.5 86.8 2.4
agriculture 120.7 287.2 335.1 338.7 338.4 332.0 324.0 2.7
financial 
services 
21.9 36.6 43.6 47.7 50.9 52.4 53.5 2.4
Source: Goskomstat
The increase in the number of independent economic units in the economy is 
of vital importance for the whole process of market transformation in Russia. This is a 
pre-condition for achieving of more flexible economic structure and reviving 
domestic competitive forces within the economic system.8
The data in Table 3 shows the changes in the shares of enterprises and 
organizations of different types of ownership. It follows that in the past decade there 
was a substantial change in the distribution of property rights in Russia. The state 
ceased to be the dominant owner of the productive assets, and by the year 2000 the 
private sector accounts for  of all enterprises in the country.
Table 3.
Distribution of enterprises and organizations by type of ownership, 1996-
2000 (in percent)
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total, percent 100 100 100 100 100
state* 14.3 9.3 5.4 5.1 4.8
municipal 8.8 7.4 6.5 6.3 6.4
non-profit 
organizations
4.2 5.2 5.8 6.3 6.9
private 63.4 69.1 73.9 74.0 74.4
other 9.3 9.0 8.6 8.3 7.5
Source: Goskomstat
* Federal and regional levels.
The market transformation of economic structure requires the development of 
the small business that may make significant contribution to economic growth and 
employment. The data in Table 4 shows that this sector experienced substantial 
8 It’s worthwhile to mention that under the classical socialist system the number of separate economic 
units was much smaller than in the mature market economies. The central governance bodies tried to 
achieve the sizes of the units and to reduce their number since they believed this would:
 increase efficiency via economies of scale;
 make it easier for them to plan and manage the economic activities within the system.
7increase in the past decade but the rates of growth of the number of small businesses 
fell in the second half of the 90th. Almost all small businesses in Russia belong to non-
state types of ownership (more than 95%).
Table 4.
Small enterprises in the Russian economy, 1993-2000*
1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
Total number,
thousands
560.0 865.0 896.9 877.3 841.7 861.1 868.0 890.6
industry 60.0 94.7 127.2 128.5 131.9 134.8 136.1 136.2
construction 72.9 92.2 123.5 145.5 138.0 142.1 137.5 135.9
retail trade 275.5 397.5 419.4 374.6 359.3 372.8 386.1 399.7
wholesale trade 15.2 18.2 15.5 16.2 14.6 14.3 13.2 14.7
Source: Goskomstat
*  The following criteria are applied to define the small enterprise:
 enterprises and organizations which are engaged in commercial activities;
 share of the state, municipalities or non-small businesses in the capital of such enterprise doesn’t 
exceed 25%;
 the average number of employees doesn’t exceed: industry, construction and transport – 100; 
agriculture – 60; retail trade – 30, other activities – 50
.
On the whole, the data shows substantial structural changes in the Russian 
enterprise sector that took place in the course of market transformation and 
corresponding institutional reforms.
2.2 Liberalization, macroeconomic management and enterprise behavior:
corporate finance, barter and money surrogates.
Liberalization of the Russian economy and subsequent first attempt of 
macroeconomic stabilization took place before privatization, development of new 
market-oriented civil legislation and other institutional reforms at the enterprise 
sector. The market rules of the game were given to the economy dominated by state-
owned enterprises whose management routines and procedures and organizational 
structures had taken shape under the socialist system and which still existed within the 
industrial structure that was inherited from Soviet times.9
The phenomena of payment arrears and subsequently of non-monetary 
settlements and monetary surrogates emerged at that moment. They permanently 
existed in the Russian economy throughout the past decade and up to now pose the 
serious challenge for macroeconomic management in Russia.
The history matters...  It turned out that price increase after the price 
liberalization far exceeded “the monetary overhang” of the late Soviet system and 
caused the severe payment arrears throughout the economy. The managers of the 
state-owned enterprises tried to support output and employment, keep existing supply 
9 Such choice is usually explained not on the basis of economic reasoning but rather on the grounds of 
political argumentation – the first post-Communist government wanted to exploit the political 
opportunity window in 1991-1992. See Гайдар Е. Государство и эволюция, 1997.
At that time it was totally unclear how the government was going to deal with the issues of huge 
military-industrial complex in the national economy. In an attempt to implement orthodox stabilization 
program the government drastically cut military expenditures and left the whole chains of enterprises 
without financing (defense enterprises and their suppliers). 
8and sales chains and showed tolerance to the payment arrears.10 Clearly such situation 
was unsustainable in the long run. 
In response to the problem the economic subjects in the past decade developed 
the impressive complex net of non-monetary settlements and money surrogates. The 
net encompassed also the budgets of different levels (primarily regional and local 
budgets). These arrangements proved to be sustainable in Russia and continued its 
existence throughout the period of institutional changes11. The most important forms 
of such settlements are:
 barter transactions;
 payments of wages in kind;
 arrears mutual offsets;
 promissory notes.
There is no comprehensive statistics available regarding the role of different 
forms of non-monetary settlements in the economy. But there are data on different 
aspects of these phenomena e.g.:
 Russian Economic Barometer provides survey data of the share of non-monetary 
settlements in the sales of the representative sample of Russian industrial firms;
 RAO Gazprom and RAO UES provide such data for their settlements with 
customers;
 Ministry of Finance and regional administrations provides data for budgets of 
different levels.
In the spring of 1997, some observers estimated the total amount of 
outstanding promissory notes (issued by all type of economic subjects) to vary 
between Rub 200-500 billion (in denominated rubles), which would make up at least 
about 2/3 of ruble M212. In accordance with Russian Economic Barometer the share 
of barter in industrial sales increased from 18% in 1994 to 45% in spring 1997. The 
accounts of 32 regions of the Russian Federation showed the average share of non-
money instruments in tax collection and budgetary expenditures of consolidated 
regional and local budgets in 1996 to be 50% and 39%, respectively.13
The econometric analysis of the results of survey of over 500 firms in Russia 
(conducted as part of a large survey of enterprises in 20 transition countries in the 
early summer of 1999 by the EBRD and the World Bank)14 revealed positive and 
statistically significant correlation between financing problems and use of barter and 
non-monetary settlements by the firms.15 Among the explanatory variables there 
were:
10 Under normal market conditions this would cause the decline of output and/or price fall. This was 
not the case in Russia where the problem of payment arrears gave birth to non-monetary settlements 
and monetary surrogates. But the overdue debts still remain high themselves – in 1999 the overdue 
payables amounted to 30% of GDP and overdue receivables amounted to 18% of GDP. 
11 The national legislation on promissory notes, articles of the Civil Code on barter (non-monetary 
exchange) transactions and mutual offsets and government regulations on tax offsets form the legal 
base for functioning of non-monetary arrangements.
12 See Annex 1 for M2/GDP ratio in 1993-1999.
13 “OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1997”, OECD, Paris, 1997.
14 See EBRD Transition Report 1999 for a description of the survey.
15 See Carlin W., Fries S., Schaffer M., Seabright P. “Barter and non-monetary transactions in 
transition economies”, EBRD Working Paper 50, 2000
9 financing problems in general;
 access to long-term bank credit;
 high interest rates;
 payments overdue to suppliers;
 receivables overdue from customers;
 tax arrears;
 frozen bank accounts;
 tax offsets.
Corporate finance proved to be a serious problem throughout the transition 
period in the aftermath of liberalization. Commercial banking system in Russia 
provided only very limited access to financing for the enterprises of the real sector. 
Bank credit to the non-financial sector as share to GDP fell from 33.6% in 1992 to 
9.1% in 1997 and slightly increased by 1999 to 10.4%.16 The development of the 
capital markets was extremely slow and they haven’t become vehicles of financing for 
enterprises.
The evaluation of this net of payment arrears and non-monetary settlements is 
a difficult task. In fact trade credit and barter exists in the mature market economies 
on a large scale. But its scale in Russia far exceeds even the level of majority of 
transition economies (see Chart 1).
Such scale of non-monetary transactions in the economy causes certain 
distortions:
 increase in transaction costs17;
 possibility of  production of goods which are non-tradable under normal market 
conditions;
 numerous opportunities for managers to get personal benefits when they sanction 
the arrangement of non-monetary settlements.
On my opinion, the existence of this complex net of payment arrears and non-
monetary arrangements modifies the money demand function of the enterprises (they 
are able to execute many transactions without using money) and the relationships 
between money supply and price dynamics. In fact enterprises themselves turned to 
be providers of liquidity within the economic system18. 
16 “OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1997”, OECD, Paris, 1997; author’s computations 
on the basis: Россия в цифрах, 2000, стр. 27, 291.
17 There is some evidence that more the firm is engaged in barter and non-monetary transactions more 
likely it undertakes the organizational change. But it has nothing to do with such types of restructuring 
as upgrading existing products or introducing the new ones. See Carlin W., Fries S., Schaffer M., 
Seabright P. “Barter and non-monetary transactions in transition economies”, EBRD Working Paper 
50, 2000
18 The real picture is even more complicated. Now the managers of the enterprises make the choice 
how to arrange transactions – using money payments or non-monetary arrangements. The decision 
depends on the bargaining power of the transaction parties, tax considerations, and personal interests of 
the managers. The declining output and rising unemployment weakens the bargaining power of 
employees and enable managers to delay payment of wages.
10
Chart 1.
Source: Carlin W., Fries S., Schaffer M., Seabright P. “Barter and non-monetary transactions in 
transition economies”, EBRD Working Paper 50, 2000.
2.3 Privatization, corporate governance and issue of incentives for 
restructuring and development.
Russia started privatization of state assets in autumn 1992. The initial social 
and political conditions determined the choice in favor of mass privatization as an 
initial scheme for transfer of property rights to the private hands. These conditions 
encompassed:
 national perception of justice and equality;
 strong bargaining position of the managers of state-owned enterprises;
 lack of domestic financial resources for sale of state assets.
Later the privatization programs of Federal, regional and municipal authorities 
have focused on the sales or transfers of remaining blocks of shares to the private 
sector through monetary auctions, investment auctions, tender offers, etc.
The important phase of the privatization process in Russia was loans-for-
shares scheme19. This scheme was the most serious step towards establishment of 
financial industrial (oligarch) groups in Russia (see Table 5).
But it turned out that the privatization itself is not sufficient for enterprise 
reform and restructuring and creation incentives for investment and development. In 
some of his public speeches President Vladimir Putin stated the acute need for 
efficient owners of the companies20.  We come now to the understanding of the fact 
that the formal transfer of property rights is necessary but not sufficient condition for 
19 See “OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1997”, OECD, Paris, 1997, pp. 138-142.
20 In a private meeting with President Putin the famous Russian writer Nobel laureate Alexander 
Solzhenitzyn talked about the possibility to revise the outcome of the whole privatization process in 
Russia in the 90th. (National News Service on the Internet)
Percentage of firms in sample of 1999 survey reporting zero level of 
barter and non-monetary transactions, by country
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Table 5.
The largest deals in the shares-for-loans auctions, 1995.
Date of 
auctions
Packet in 
auction 
(% of 
shares)
Starting 
price, 
USD 
million
Winning 
bid, USD 
million
Formal 
winner 
(guaranteeing 
bank)
Actual 
winner
Norilsk 
Nickel
17 Nov 38 (51% 
of votes)
170 170.1 Uneximbank 
(MFK)
Uneximbank
YUKOS 8 Dec 45 150 159 Laguna 
(Menatep, 
Tokobank, 
SBS Bank)
Menatep
Sidanko 7 Dec 51 125 130 MFK 
(Uneximbank)
Uneximbank
Sibneft 28 Dec 51 100 100.1 SBS Bank 
and OIL 
Finance 
Company 
(Menatep)
Sibneft
Surgutneftegaz 3 Nov 40.12 66.7 88.3 Surgutneftegaz 
Pension Fund
Surgutneftegaz
Uneximbank
Lukoil 7 Dec 5 35 35.01 Lukoil, 
Imperial Bank 
(Slavianskii)
Lukoil, 
Imperial Bank
Novolipetskii 
Metallurgical 
Kombinat
7 Dec 14.84 30 31 MFK 
(Uneximbank)
Uneximbank
Source: “OECD Economic Surveys: Russian Federation 1997”, OECD, Paris, 1997, pp. 138-142.
efficient development of the enterprises. The attention now is focused on:
 the importance of corporate governance and efficient ownership structures21;
 promotion of competition and efficient regulation on the industrial level which 
imposes discipline on the enterprises;
 reform of tax system.
The enterprise as an economic institution goes through major changes in the 
process of market transformation22. The new actors appear on the stage-shareholders, 
the enterprise changes its relations with the state, private credit institutions, and 
outside creditors, customers and suppliers.
21 The analytical framework on corporate governance institutions and ownership structures is provided 
in Dyck A. “Ownership Structure, Legal Protections and Corporate Governance”, Harvard Business 
School, 2000, mimeo. The author stresses:
 necessity of effective national legal protections that require complementary governance institutions 
including political structure, the location of judicial authority, norms, and information/reputation 
intermediaries;
 beneficial effect of identity and concentration of ownership for corporate governance in the 
absence of effective legal protections.
22 The new institutional economics has assigned more rigors to the notion of institution-as certain type 
of organization, on the one hand, and certain rules and norms, on the other-and showed its importance 
for economic analysis. The recognition of this research paradigm by economics profession was 
manifested in the last decade by awarding the Nobel Prize to Professor Ronald Coase and Professor 
Douglass North. 
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The key result of Russian mass privatization was insider control. Managers and 
employees have acquired majority stakes in more than 75% of the privatized 
companies23. The speed of Russian privatization was achieved due to the prevalence 
of the management-employee buy-outs (see Table 6).
Table 6.
Methods of privatization for medium-sized and large state-owned 
enterprises in some transition countries (% of total by number, as of end 
1995).
Sale to 
outside 
owner
Management-
employee 
buy-out
Equal 
access 
voucher 
privatization
Restitution Other Still in 
state 
hands
Russia 0 55 11 0 0 34
Poland 2 30 6 0 8 54
Hungary 38 7 0 0 33 22
Czech 
Republic
32 0 22 9 28 10
Source: Aghion P., Carlin W. “Restructuring outcomes and the evolution of ownership patterns in 
Central and Eastern Europe” in “Lessons From the Economic Transition”, OECD, 1997. 
Later the data showed the increase in the share of outside ownership but it’s 
not clear whether they show the emergence of real outside owners or just mask 
increasing ownership stakes by managers (see Table 7).
Table 7.
Ownership structure in medium and large privatized companies in Russia.
1994 1996 1998 2000
Direct insider 
ownership
60-65 55-60 50-55 30-35
Outside 
ownership
12-25 30-35 35-40 50-55
State 15-20 9-10 5-10 10-12
Source: Nestor S. “Corporate reform in Russia and the former Soviet Union: the first ten years”, East-
West Conference, November 5-6, 2000, Vienna, Austria.
On the whole managers have very high degree of control in major of Russian 
privatized companies (as well as in formally state-owned enterprises). At the same 
time employees have relatively weak bargaining positions under the conditions of 
output decline and rising unemployment. It turns out that managerial incentives are 
substantially distorted. Much of their interest is focused not on the investment and 
development but on asset stripping through pocket outside firms or rent seeking. They 
23 Nestor S. “Corporate reform in Russia and the former Soviet Union: the first ten years”, East-West 
Conference, November 5-6, 2000, Vienna, Austria.
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pursue short-term personal benefits rather than goals of long-term development of 
their companies24.
Privatization failed to promote the domestic competitive environment in 
Russia. Concentration in many sectors of the economy is very high and getting higher; 
recent data indicate 4-firm concentration ratio in Russian industries at 95% when 
measure at regional level25.  The presence of powerful financial industrial (oligarch) 
groups creates additional pressure for concentration through mergers and acquisitions.
The tax system in the Russian Federation is being reformed at the moment. 
The first part of the Tax Code was implemented from 1999 and the second part will 
be in force from 2001. The key issue is to rationalize the system, to make it more 
simple and transparent and to improve tax administration in practice. The government 
is a stakeholder for the enterprise sector and the tax relations should be rationalized.
At present the incentives for substantial investments (with emphasis on long-
term development) remain weak for the Russian enterprises26. They undertake more 
reactive restructuring activities than deep restructuring activities27. And the corporate 
governance system plays extremely important role for the transaction of investing in 
the enterprise.
III. Policy alternatives: revision of the privatization results or development of 
efficient corporate governance system.
President Vladimir Putin from the beginning stressed his commitment to 
respect and protect property rights. At the same time the situation with the corporate 
governance at the start of his tenure was declared unsatisfactory. Russian authorities 
faced real dilemma either to revise the privatization results (and often on a purely 
legal ground) or to accept the existing ownership structure as the starting point for 
further actions and put special emphasis on the policy measures that promote efficient 
corporate governance system:
 to develop national legal protection system so that the law is properly enforced by 
the state but not by the criminal groups;
 to protect the rights of all shareholders;
 to fight the phenomenon of state capture by private vested interests.
The impressive net of barter and non-monetary settlements was also the 
important factor of the business environment in Russia. There was no easy and 
straightforward solution to the problem but the Government and the Central Bank 
should:
24 The world of fantastic opportunities for managers emerged in the period of perestroika, it 
substantially widened in the period of the market transformation. The state withdrew its control from 
the enterprise sector and no efficient owner emerged.
25 Nestor S. “Corporate reform in Russia and the former Soviet Union: the first ten years”, East-West 
Conference, November 5-6, 2000, Vienna, Austria.
26 See: Annex 2 for fixed capital investment performance in Russia; EBRD Transition Report 1999, 
Chapter 9. 
27 See EBRD Transition Report 1999, Chapter 9 for discussion of the reactive restructuring vs. deep 
restructuring. 
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 harden budget constraints with regard to tax arrears;
 enforce bankruptcy law with regard to all types of arrears;
 consider the possibility to develop the procedures of discounting certain types of 
high quality promissory notes by the Central Bank via the commercial banks.
These alternatives clearly stood behind many reform steps which were put on the 
agenda in Russia in the first decade of this century.
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A n n e x   1.
Chart 2.
Source: Goskomstat, author’s calculations.
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A n n e x  2
Chart 3
Source: Goskomstat, author’s calculations.
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